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AN IPD IMPLEMENTATION IN THE MIDDLE 
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Samuel Korb1, Eran Haronian2, Rafael Sacks3, Pedro Judez4, and Ory Shaked5 
ABSTRACT 
What are the key success factors and barriers that can be expected when implementing 
Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) for the first time in a traditional construction culture? We 
present an in-depth case study of the “Saxum” project under construction in Abu Ghosh, 
Israel, the first implementation of IPD in this traditional construction culture. The goal is 
to glean insight into the dynamics that support and/or subvert the required paradigm shift. 
The researchers interviewed the key participants, visited the site and reviewed source 
material from this and other IPD projects. 
Despite cultural and historical factors that were expected to prevent or weaken 
implementation of a collaborative approach like IPD, the key participants built the project 
according to the IPD framework. The insistence of the overseas project owner's 
representative that IPD be employed, coupled with the openness of the local partners to 
work differently, were found to be critical success factors. The participants' mindset and 
their behavior changed fundamentally with respect to their traditional roles, as did the 
character of the project (which was measured on a multi-factor sliding scale from 
“traditional” to “pure IPD”). 
Prior to this successful implementation, the opinion of local practitioners on IPD could 
be summed up as: “Nice in theory, but not applicable in our adversarial construction 
business culture.” Yet this project has shown that given the right combination of agents, it 
is not only feasible but also rewarding to adopt. 
While there are multiple accounts of IPD implementations, we focus here on viewing 
the case study through the lens of change management with an analysis of the local cultural 
barriers that were overcome. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“This was a difficult project, and without the collaborative approach, I have no doubt 
that we would have ended up in court over some of the problems that came up. But 
because we had the IPD framework, we managed to work things out internally, since 
everyone was committed to finishing the project, not just to their own personal 
financial interests.” - Project Manager, Saxum Center 
In 1994, a worldwide Christian institution decided to realize the vision of its founder and 
build a center in Israel (Saxum Foundation 2014). After years of searching, in 2007 a 
15,000 m2 plot was acquired in Abu Ghosh, a town not far from Jerusalem, and the 
development of the initial design was begun. 
A European engineer with years of experience in the construction industry was hired as 
the Owner’s Representative (OR) for the project in 2010. The complex will consist of 7,700 
m2, distributed in three main zones: a Conference Center, for spiritual retreats, workshops 
and conferences, with 50 guest rooms, two chapels, and common areas, dining room and 
classrooms; a Hospitality Center for training in professional hostelry skills; and a 
Multimedia Resource Center, where pilgrims will have access to information for their 
sojourn in the Holy Land, offering also training courses for tour guides and travel operators 
(Saxum Foundation 2014). The contract budget for the construction of the building was 
US$17 million (without landscaping, design costs, taxes or equipment). 
The OR had previous good experiences using transparent agreements, although none 
as collaborative as IPD. From these experiences, he realized that collaborative approaches 
were essential in creating win-win relationships between owners and contractors, as 
opposed to the traditional situation in which the two parties are contractually opposed from 
day one. Thus the OR decided that he would introduce Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) 
(AIA 2012) into the project.  
There was only one problem: no one in the country had ever implemented IPD in a 
construction project before. Although the approach is taught in construction management 
courses at the Technion and had been presented at an industry conference in 2010, no 
building had ever been built in Israel using a collaborative contract such as partnering, 
alliancing or IPD. Yet ultimately the OR prevailed. The project was successfully delivered, 
while using IPD principles. Since this was the first IPD implementation in a country, we 
seek to explain the dynamics at work so that future IPD practitioners who wish to break 
into new markets can learn from the experiences (both positive and negative) of Saxum. 
MANAGING CHANGE 
Though IPD is technically a method of contractual agreements among the parties in a 
construction project, at root, it seeks to drive new ways of working for the professionals 
involved in the project. Thus the process of implementing IPD can draw on knowledge 
about the field of Organization Behavior, specifically the domain of Change Management. 
Change Management researchers seek to understand the mechanisms and phenomena 
at work when an organization and the individuals within it undergo a shift in their work 
processes and mindsets. One of the pioneers in the field was Lewin (1952), who proposed 
the “Unfreeze, Change, Refreeze” model of change. Kotter (1996) built upon this, outlining 
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eight stages that organizations go through when undergoing change: establishing a sense 
of urgency, creating the guiding coalition, developing a vision and strategy, 
communicating the change vision, empowering broad-based action, generating short-term 
wins, consolidating gains and producing more change, and anchoring new approaches in 
the culture. 
An underlying assumption of “Organizational Change Management” approaches 
(Todnem By 2005) is that there is an existing organization with prevailing “ways things 
are done around here” that is changed. Yet in construction, each project is an ad-hoc 
collection of companies joined together for the extent of the particular project. Thus a 
better-suited model may be the ADKAR model (Hiatt 2006), which focuses on the level of 
the individual. Which phases does each person go through as they experience change? 
Awareness – an initial understanding that the change is on the horizon 
Desire – identifying “what’s in it for me” and becomes a change supporter  
Knowledge – “how” to make the change, typically through formal learning 
Ability – the ability to work in the new way, typically gained through hands-on 
experience with the new methods 
Reinforcement – the new patterns of behavior are reinforced by the new work 
environment 
Like many deeper changes, the transition to IPD entails not just changing behavior but 
changing the more deeply-held beliefs they have about their behavior and the organization: 
their paradigms (Barker 1993). AEC professionals implementing IPD must learn to see 
other project participants not as opponents to be overcome – an example of a zero-sum 
approach (Emiliani 2008) – but rather as colleagues to cooperate with in order to attain 
mutual success for the project and each of the participants. This is “non-zero-sum” 
thinking: for each party to succeed, it need not be at the expense of another. 
EXPECTED DIFFICULTIES 
When the OR approached the Israeli construction market with his desire to use IPD, he was 
met with skepticism about the applicability of the approach to the local culture and 
construction sub-culture, since the mainstay of Israeli construction remains the traditional 
Design-Bid-Build method. According to the Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions Theory 
(2001), Israeli culture is marked by very low power distance and high uncertainty 
avoidance. Israel’s history as a melting pot of immigrants has left its legacy in the low-
context nature of the culture. These elements help to explain the fricative nature of Israeli 
discourse. Short tempers and shorter fuses are not considered amenable to the collaborative 
approach that IPD requires. Israeli construction companies are staffed by people who come 
from various ethnic backgrounds, in which smaller companies (subcontractors) are 
typically homogenous in their ethnic makeup (Priven and Sacks 2015). Given the complex 
political history of the country, this means there is even more of a tendency to keep inter-
company relations at arm’s (and contract’s) length. Rached et al. (2014) explored the 
openness of construction professionals in the region to IPD, and found that many of those 
surveyed indicated that IPD would likely conflict with the local construction culture. 
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Another difficulty is that which confronts any implementation of IPD regardless of 
underlying regional cultures: the natural tendency to slide back into well-known behaviors. 
Though collaboration has the potential to reward all participating parties, as game theory 
explains, individual actors may be tempted to “defect” and attempt to exploit the 
collaboration in pursuit of their own particular agendas. As the success of the “tit for tat” 
strategy has shown (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981), this is a fool’s errand, but for people and 
organizations used to maximizing their own short-term payoff, it will no-doubt beckon. 
Each member of the collaboration has to navigate a network of different considerations and 
competing priorities: their interests as a member of the project (and commitments to that 
project, to which they have committed their reputation and good name), their own personal 
interests regardless of the project, their prior interactions and relationships with the other 
parties, as well as their expectations of future relationships and contracts with the other 
parties. 
THE TEAM AND THE CONDITIONS 
In that context, the OR set about assembling the team that would bring Saxum and IPD to 
life in Israel. The first partner to come on board was the Architect. Though initially 
skeptical about IPD, the OR’s drive and commitment to the method brought him around. 
The OR also brought in a local professional construction Project Manager (PM) after 
numerous interviews and much additional explanation of the IPD approach. The OR, the 
Architect, and the PM then sought the right contractor. Though they met with some major 
contractors, the response was lukewarm. Ultimately they found a General Contractor (GC) 
who agreed to work under the conditions IPD requires: transparency, target cost, share 
bonus and penalties, preconstruction services, fixed fee, etc.  
Before signing the contract, it was necessary to explain IPD to the lawyers of each 
partner. A baseline document helped; ConsensusDOCS 300 was selected and adapted to 
suit the Israeli legal system. Finally, an ‘IPD-like’ agreement was signed with the following 
stipulations: the direct costs “as built” of the project would be paid back-to-back to invoices 
and team salaries throughout the construction phase; at project completion, the total Real 
Cost (RC) of the budget would be measured up against the Target Cost (TC). If RC > TC, 
then there is “Pain Sharing”: the owner and GC cover the additional expenses in an 80-20 
ratio, with the GC’s contribution capped at one third of his fee. 
In the opposite scenario where RC < TC, there is “Gain Sharing”. The savings below 
the TC are distributed as follows: 
20% to the GC 
10% to the Architect 
10% to the PM 
60% to the owner 
The Target Cost was developed by the OR in collaboration with the owner and other 
construction professionals and colleagues. The proposed construction budget was created 
during the pre-construction design phase. The design team created a construction budget 
to determine if it could be brought within the TC. Through successive iterations of design 
and cost estimation refinement informed by the GC’s input as to constructability and 
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preferred construction methods, the construction budget achieved the desired level. Once 
that happened, construction began immediately with the existing team without the need to 
go through a bidding process. 
The project was overseen by the “Collaborative Project Delivery” (CPD) team, 
composed of the OR, the PM, the Architect, and the GC. The CPD was responsible for all 
of the major decisions about the project; in the case that the CPD was not in consensus 
about a particular issue, it was put to a vote. The Architect and GC each had one vote while 
the OR and PM shared a vote. At the same time, the OR retained a veto over decisions that 
were deemed unacceptable. The day-to-day management of the project was in the hands of 
the Project Execution Team (PET), composed of the site engineer (representative of the 
GC), site inspector (representative of the PM), an architect from the studio of the Project 
Architect, and the OR. 
SELECTED PROJECT EXPERIENCES 
While the project was eventually considered a success, along the way there were inevitable 
ups and downs. This section describes three vignettes that illustrate such situations. 
THE AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM 
The project was initially designed with a radiant heating and cooling system based on a 
proprietary technology to be supplied from abroad. However, the supplier went bankrupt, 
which meant the system would not be delivered to the project. The team scrambled, 
eventually deciding on a conventional ducted HVAC system. However, since construction 
had already begun, all the new ducts had to be routed around existing systems, and 
openings had to be created in existing poured concrete walls and precast hollow-core 
flooring planks (including the engineering complications the latter entails). 
Had the project been conventionally structured, a change of this magnitude so late in 
the process could have led to infighting and recriminations. But instead of going head-to-
head, the team members worked shoulder-to-shoulder in order to persevere. The members 
of the CPD accepted responsibility for jointly managing the process, and the influence that 
comes with it. But with that responsibility came their participation in the risks of the 
project, like the bankruptcy of a key supplier. This incident was a test of the strength of the 
commitment of the parties to the project and to the collaborative approach, and they passed 
with flying colors. Their response to the unexpected development was focused on solving 
the problem at hand for the project, and not exploiting the mishap as an opportunity to 
redress grievances with other parties to the agreement. 
THE BIM MODEL 
The OR proposed that the project be designed using Building Information Modeling (BIM). 
However, the designers were used to designing in 2D, and it was decided that instead of 
designing in BIM, an external company would be hired to take the output of the designers 
(2D engineering drawings) and convert them into the 3D model in BIM, where clash 
detection could be performed, with the clashes reported back to the designers. However, 
this added an additional layer of complexity to the management of the design process, with 
the outcome being that the process was much less efficient than it could have been. 
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A second BIM model was developed internally by the site engineer to support 
production organization. This was useful, but stopped when the person left the project. The 
use of BIM is highly recommended for IPD projects (Sacks et al. 2010), and the 
inefficiencies encountered in Saxum are testament to the opportunities that were missed. 
USE OF PROJECT MANAGER HUMAN RESOURCES BY THE CONTRACTOR 
Once construction began, the CPD realized that additional resources needed to be devoted 
to the management of this phase. Rather than bring in new people, two members of the 
PM’s team, the site inspector and design coordinator, would take on additional roles as the 
site engineer and production assistant, respectively. They remained employees of the PM, 
but were paid an additional amount from the construction budget, taking instructions from 
the GC. “In a regular project, having people from the PM team work for the GC would be 
an unheard of conflict of interest, but thanks to the collaborative effort, we made it work,” 
commented the PM. The shared commitment to complete the project on time and within 
the target cost (coupled with the financial transparency) allowed the team to consider a 
unorthodox solution. In order to resolve the inspector’s potential conflict of interest, an 
outside quality assurance firm was hired. 
RESULTS OF THE PROJECT 
As of this writing, the project is still a few months away from completion, but the end is 
within sight and the OR is very satisfied. The quality of the product is very high, which is 
one of the most important aspects for the customer, and is the major factor driving their 
satisfaction. As for cost, even with the setbacks, changes in personnel, and unexpected 
developments, the project will come in at or slightly below the target cost. While this means 
that there may be little or no “gain sharing,” this also means the owner will be paying more 
or less the price they were expecting. In terms of schedule, the project is about four months 
behind the initial predictions. Despite the delay, the owner is satisfied, since their priority 
was to achieve a high level of quality at a reasonable cost.  
The owner's lawyer reports that, unlike typical projects in which participants are in 
frequent contact throughout to clarify the requirements of the contract, in the Saxum project 
he hasn’t really heard from the partners since the contract was signed. There have been no 
legal claims among the parties despite the many unexpected problems.  
The Saxum project did not exploit all of the commonly recognized opportunities of IPD 
and apparently the project could have been delivered for less money, yet it did manage to 
maintain the core principles of IPD and achieve a successful outcome. Table 1 portrays the 
authors' assessment of the project's position within the range from “traditional” to “full 
IPD” for a number of different factors, based on the factors described by the AIA (2012). 
DISCUSSION 
What lessons can be abstracted from Saxum that are relevant to other IPD pioneers in new 
countries or regions? Specifically, what are the important points which lead to the success 
of the project, and what were the difficulties that were encountered along the way? 
Overcoming “But We’re Different”: an IPD Implementation in the Middle East. 
 
9 
Section 7: People Change and Culture 
Table 1: Saxum on the scale from “Traditional” to “IPD”: tabular explanation 
Subject 1: Traditional Saxum 5: IPD Vision 
Contract 2-sided, costs and 
work content 
3: Used ConsensDOCS, but 
Architect has separate contract 
Multi-party, relational 
contract 
Design Process By Architect, prior to 
bidding 
4: GC involved, but no Big 
Room 
Collaborative, with GC 
integrally involved. Use of 
“Big Room” 
Pain/Gain 
Sharing 
Set prices for set 
work content 
3: GC, Architect, Proj Manager 
share gain. GC shares pain 
After agreeing on TC, all 
parties share gain and pain 
BIM Used primarily for 
design 
2: Only partially used for 
construction 
Used as tool for 
collaboration, during design 
and construction 
Cooperation Sporadic, and only as 
it befits local 
optimization 
4: CPD cooperates fully. 
Subcontractors less so. 
Ongoing, to jointly pursue 
project-level optimization 
Decision 
Making 
Divided, each party 
decides in area of 
speciality 
5: CPD responsible for major 
decisions 
Core team jointly decides, 
together with owner 
Subcontractor 
Selection 
By GC, mostly by 
lowest cost 
5: Chose subcontractors based 
on prior experience, by CPD 
By CPD, by reliability and 
quality of subcontractor 
GC Selection DBB: Lowest-cost GC 
bid, after design 
complete 
4: Chosen ahead of time based 
on quality 
First choose team 
members (including GC), 
then design together 
Interviews with the key site personnel showed the relevance of the ADKAR model of 
change discussed above. The IPD contract provided the basis for gaining the Awareness 
and Knowledge, and the Gain/Pain Sharing mechanisms helped align their interests and 
contribute to their Desire to work collaboratively. Each occasion in which the team 
cooperatively resolved an issue that would under other contractual terms lead to 
confrontation, such as the need to replace the HVAC system, provided positive 
reinforcement.  
KEY SUCCESS FACTORS OF THE IPD IMPLEMENTATION 
The personalities of the individuals involved in the project has been identified as the key 
success factor, both by project participants and in the analysis of the authors. Each 
participant had to have enough openness to be willing to try working in a new way, one 
that differed from their years of experience. They are what Rogers called “early adopters” 
(Rogers 2003). 
Each of the individuals on the CPD had key personality traits that enabled success. The 
OR was the driving factor who brought IPD to a new country. Interestingly, and perhaps 
crucially, despite his commitment to IPD, he had no prior experience in the local 
construction industry. It may be that as a foreigner and cultural “outsider” he was granted 
more leniency to stray from cultural and business norms, at least enough to make his case. 
Despite being told that local conditions were different from those he was familiar with, he 
decided that they were not different enough such that IPD would be unviable. And of 
course, as the representative of the owner (who is paying for the project), he retained the 
privilege to place demands on the suppliers, including the use of IPD.  By submitting 
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himself to the collaborative approach, the OR released some of his control over the project; 
decisions about the project would be made jointly by the CPD. Though he retained a veto 
over the CPD’s decisions, but he was disinclined to use it so as not to negatively impact 
the collaborative spirit. In practice, the veto was never used, even though there were some 
decisions in which he was in the minority. 
Owner of overseas projects tend to be risk-averse, preferring a “fixed price” contract 
arrangement. Here the opposite was true: the pain/gain sharing mechanisms meant that the 
owner had no idea ahead of time what the final price would be; there was no “guaranteed 
maximum”. This may actually be a more realistic worldview on the OR’s part. The 
“security” and “control” supposedly offered by fixed-price traditional contracting models 
are to a large extent self-delusion; the owner will ultimately bear the brunt of inefficiencies 
and cost overruns. In IPD there are incentives for the bad news to come out much earlier, 
even during the design phase, rather than having problems simmering “behind the scenes” 
until they become too big to hide (more typical of an environment in which information 
hoarding is incentivized; fixed price contracts are a prime example). One underlying 
assumption for owners adopting IPD is an understanding that the bid price of a traditional 
contract is not really going to be the actual price.  
The personalities of the other team members were also crucial to the outcome of the 
project. The PM was hand-picked by an authority familiar with both IPD and the players 
in the domestic market as someone with an academic background who was open to new 
methods. Rather than being a turn-off, the OR’s description of IPD was one of the main 
reasons the PM joined; this was an opportunity to gain experience with an innovative 
method. The Architect demonstrated enough openness to go forward with IPD (even 
though he was not contractually bound to do so, since his engagement to work on the 
project had begun even before the OR arrived). The GC was willing (unlike most of the 
contractors that were approached) to use IPD, including all the changes it would entail in 
the way he was used to working: transparent accounting, shared decision-making 
responsibility with the other members of the CPD, and participation in the pain sharing 
mechanism. 
Another key success factor was the pre-existing relationships among some of the 
parties prior to beginning work on the IPD project. The Architect had previously worked 
with both the GC and the owner.  The GC requested (and was granted) permission to 
employ subcontractors he had worked with in the past, rather than going with the lowest 
bid for each trade, in order to reduce the number of “surprises”. When participants have 
worked together in the past (and had positive experiences doing so), they will be more 
willing to commit to a collaborative venture. This is due to the trust they have for one 
another, which is the underlying element of this success factor. Without trust, even the 
most detailed IPD contract in the world cannot force the team members to cooperate and 
work as partners. Personal acquaintance and "good chemistry" between the stakeholders 
are a must. 
BARRIERS TO IPD IMPLEMENTATION 
Despite the eventual success of the project, there were items that could have been improved 
upon along the way. In Lean terms, by engaging in hansei (reflection) upon the negative 
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aspects of the implementation, it is possible to improve upon them in future journeys down 
this path. 
It is interesting to refer back to the “barriers” that the OR was told to expect when he 
decided to bring IPD to Israel. Ultimately the culture proved to be a non-issue; the lively 
and brash style that marks Israeli interpersonal communication may actually be a boon to 
a collaborative approach, since it is through discussion that a team can create the best 
solutions to the problems they face. The team members were able to adapt to new 
collaborative modes of working. For example, the site inspector related how, despite his 
initial gut reaction was to default to a confrontational, offensive position, in time he learned 
to consider the site engineer a partner.  
At the same time, the temptation to slip back into established patterns of behavior was 
ever-present, and there were examples of “local optimization” at the expense of the project. 
One case in which this happened was early in the project during the earthworks to prepare 
the site. The subcontractor who excavated the foundations of the building submitted an 
invoice that didn’t align with the expectations of the team. The GC wanted to pay the bill 
as written, whereas the PM (who releases the money) objected. This almost led to a conflict 
that could have threatened the continuation of the IPD. Luckily the sides calmed down 
enough to work together to address the situation as partners (they disputed the invoice). 
Even though an IPD agreement has been signed, constant effort must be made in 
continually developing relationships and learning new ways of working. 
The project struggled with the best way to involve subcontractors in the collaborative 
efforts, like many other implementations of IPD. Despite the OR, Architect, GC, and PM 
participating in the CPD and a collaborative approach, from the point of view of the 
subcontractors (who actually performed the vast majority of the work in constructing the 
building), there was no major difference in Saxum; their contracts and compensation were 
not far from the norms they were used to. Had there been a more effective way to get them 
on board as part of the collaborative effort (or some critical subset of the prime trades), the 
project outcome could have been even more successful. 
CONCLUSION 
A Jewish architect and GC, a Christian OR, a Muslim site engineer and a mixed Jewish-
Muslim workforce met in an Israeli-Arab town in the Jerusalem foothills to build a project 
using a new method of contractual relationships – though this sounds like the beginning of 
a bad joke, the Saxum project moves closer to successful (quality, schedule, budget) 
completion with each passing day, and with it, the first building to have been built using 
IPD in the country (and perhaps the region). If IPD can work here, as the project has proven, 
then it can likely work anywhere (to a greater or lesser degree). This includes other projects 
domestically, other projects in the region, and even other parts of the world where the 
culture is thought to be less than conducive to collaborative approaches. Yes, the project 
owner was a non-profit organization whose primary interest in the project was not making 
money. But like any owner, they still had the same project goals of cost, quality, and 
reasonable lead time. The IPD approach is not based on expectation of ethical behavior 
arising from altruistic motivation, but on the right alignment of the common interest of all 
of the stakeholders to get the right money for their work. 
Samuel Korb , Eran Haronian , Rafael Sacks , Pedro Judez , and Ory Shaked 
12 Proceedings IGLC-24, July 2016 | Boston, USA 
 
The main challenges for a would-be IPD pioneer are thus: 
Finding the right principal people for the project, i.e. professional and open-minded; 
Inculcating the values of IPD; 
Educating a team to exploit the opportunity provided by the collaboration to remove 
waste and gain values, primarily through the use of Lean Construction and BIM. 
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